

# CIG ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS



1 of 1

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1 November 1946

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
INSTRUCTION  
C.I.G. ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. [REDACTED]

ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS OF THE  
OFFICE OF REPORTS AND ESTIMATES

Reference: N.I.A. Directive No. 1

DA QA/QC:  
02/08/01. SY

1. To implement the provisions of Paragraph 6 of N.I.A. Directive No. 1, each member of the Intelligence Advisory Board will designate a personal representative to remain assigned to his office and detailed as liaison to the Projects Division of the Intelligence Staff of the Office of Reports and Estimates of the Central Intelligence Group.

2. These representatives will, as their chiefs direct, either concur in C.I.G. intelligence estimates or present dissenting opinions.

3. Each intelligence estimate issued by C.I.G. will either have the concurrence of all I.A.B. members or will have any substantial dissent appended as a part of the estimate or follow as provided in 4 below.

4. This procedure will not be permitted to prevent the presentation of any estimate on the required date. If concurrence or dissenting opinions cannot be obtained in time to meet deadlines for completion and submission of estimates, such estimates will be submitted together with a statement that only limited coordination has been attained and substantial dissent, if any, will be submitted at a later date.

5. C.I.G. will afford designated representatives complete opportunity to participate in all phases of the development of estimates.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE:  
RENUMBERED PER CIA GENERAL ORDER [REDACTED]  
EFFECTIVE 30 JUNE 1947 CIG ADMINISTRATIVE ORDERS WILL REMAIN IN FORCE UNTIL  
CANCELLED OR SUPERSEDED [REDACTED]

Colonel, CAC  
Executive for Personnel and Administration

1 November 1946

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUPC.I.G. ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER [REDACTED]ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS OF THE  
OFFICE OF REPORTS AND ESTIMATES

Reference: N.I.A. Directive No. 1

1. To implement the provisions of Paragraph 6 of N.I.A. Directive No. 1, each member of the Intelligence Advisory Board will designate a personal representative to remain assigned to his office and detailed as liaison to the Projects Division of the Intelligence Staff of the Office of Reports and Estimates of the Central Intelligence Group.
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5. C.I.G. will afford designated representatives complete opportunity to participate in all phases of the development of estimates.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE:

[REDACTED]  
Colonel, CAC

Executive for Personnel and Administration

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1 November 19.

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AGENCY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

C.I.A. ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER

ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS OF THE  
OFFICE OF REPORTS AND ESTIMATES

Reference: N.I.A. Directive No. 1

1. To implement the provisions of Paragraph 6 of N.I.A. Directive No. 1, each member of the Intelligence Advisory Board will designate a personal representative to remain assigned to his office and detailed as liaison to the Projects Division of the Intelligence Staff of the Office of Reports and Estimates, Central Intelligence Agency.

2. These representatives will, under their direct, either concur in C.I.A. intelligence estimates or present dissenting opinions.

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FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE:

Colonel, CAC  
Executive for Personnel and Administration

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27 November 1948

MEMORANDUM FOR COL. HENRY B. MOORE, DEPT. OF STATE REPRESENTATIVE  
COL. NORMAN J. TRACY, A-2 REPRESENTATIVE  
COL. S. B. PROCTOR, A-1 REPRESENTATIVE  
MR. C. W. MORRIS, A-2 REPRESENTATIVE

Subject: Chinese Minorities in Southeast Asia

Reference: C.I.O. Administrative Order [REDACTED]

Enclosure: Draft CIO Intelligence Estimate, same subject as above.

1. Pursuant to the provisions of the Reference, the enclosed draft report is circulated herewith for concurrence or comment.

2. In view of the fact that this is the first C.I.O. intelligence estimate handled in this manner, it is suggested that each addressee, together with additional representatives of his agency if desired, attend a meeting to discuss the enclosure at 2:00 PM, Monday, 2 December 1948, in Room 112, Central Building, 2430 R Street, N.W. It is requested that the undersigned be notified by phone (Executive 6115, extension 2808) if the proposed time of the meeting is satisfactory.

[REDACTED]  
Acting Chief, Projects Div.

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Distribution:

As noted above  
plus  
1 cc Intelligence Staff  
1 cc Far East/[REDACTED]

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(Sender will circle classification Top and Bottom)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP  
INTER-OFFICE ROUTING SLIP  
(Revised 10 Sept 1946)

FROM	TO	INITIALS	DATE
	DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE		
	EXECUTIVE TO THE DIRECTOR		
	SECRETARY TO THE DIRECTOR		
	EXECUTIVE OFFICE: ASST. EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR		
	ADVISORY COUNCIL		
	EXECUTIVE FOR PERSONNEL & ADMINISTRATION		
	CENTRAL RECORDS		
	SECRETARY, NIA		
	CHIEF, INTERDEPARTMENTAL STAFF		
	ASST. DIRECTOR, SPECIAL OPERATIONS		
	ASST. DIRECTOR, RESEARCH & EVALUATION		
	ASST. DIRECTOR, COLLECTION & DISSEMINATION		
	CHIEF, SECURITY BRANCH		

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11/1/46  
[redacted] stated to [redacted] that the attached  
directive had been approved by the Director and  
Exec. to the Director.

APPROVAL	INFORMATION	DIRECT REPLY
ACTION	RETURN	COMMENT
RECOMMENDATION	PREPARATION OF REPLY	FILE
SIGNATURE	CONCURRENCE	DISPATCH

REMARKS: For issuance as approved by IAB.  
Please set this office's copy & additional  
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COPY NO. FR

1 November 1946

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

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C.I.G. ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER [REDACTED]

ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS OF THE  
OFFICE OF REPORTS AND ESTIMATES

*Reference: N.I.A. Directive No. 1*

1. To implement the provisions of Paragraph 6 <sup>*of*</sup> N.I.A. Directive No. 1, each member of the Intelligence Advisory Board will designate a personal representative to remain assigned to his office and detailed as liaison to the Projects <sup>*Division*</sup> ~~Branch~~ of the Intelligence Staff of the Office of Reports and Estimates of the Central Intelligence Group.
2. These representatives will, as their chiefs direct, either concur in C.I.G. intelligence estimates or present dissenting opinions.
3. Each intelligence estimate issued by C.I.G. will either have the concurrence of all I.A.B. members or will have any substantial dissent appended as a part of the estimate or follow as provided in 4 below.
4. This procedure will not be permitted to prevent the presentation of any estimate on the required date. If concurrence or dissenting opinions cannot be <sup>*obtained*</sup> ~~prepared~~ in time to meet deadlines for completion and submission of estimates, such estimates will be submitted together with a statement that <sup>*only*</sup> ~~only~~ limited coordination has been attained and substantial dissent, if any, will be submitted at a later date<sup>*s*</sup>.
5. C.I.G. will afford designated representatives complete opportunity to participate in all phases of the development of estimates.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE:

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[REDACTED]  
Colonel, CAC  
Executive for Personnel and Administration

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUPC.I.G. ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER [REDACTED]ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS OF THE  
OFFICE OF REPORTS AND ESTIMATESReference: N.I.A. Directive No. 1

1. To implement the provisions of Paragraph 6 of N.I.A. Directive No. 1, each member of the Intelligence Advisory Board will designate a personal representative to remain assigned to his office and detailed as liaison to the Projects Division of the Intelligence Staff of the Office of Reports and Estimates of the Central Intelligence Group.
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FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE:

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[REDACTED]

Colonel, CAC  
Executive for Personnel and Administration



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUPC.I.G. ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER [REDACTED]ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS OF THE  
OFFICE OF REPORTS AND ESTIMATESReference: M.I.A. Directive No. 1

1. To implement the provisions of Paragraph 6 of M.I.A. Directive No. 1, each member of the Intelligence Advisory Board will designate a personal representative to remain assigned to his office and detailed as liaison to the Projects Division of the Intelligence Staff of the Office of Reports and Estimates of the Central Intelligence Group.

2. These representatives will, as their chiefs direct, either concur in C.I.G. intelligence estimates or present dissenting opinions.

3. Each intelligence estimate issued by C.I.G. will either have the concurrence of all I.A.B. members or will have any substantial dissent appended as a part of the estimate or follow as provided in 4. below.

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FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE:

[REDACTED]  
Colonel, CAC

Executive for Personnel and Administration

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1 November 1946

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUPC.I.G. ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER [REDACTED]ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS OF THE  
OFFICE OF REPORTS AND ESTIMATESReference: N.I.A. Directive No. 1

1. To implement the provisions of Paragraph 6 of N.I.A. Directive No. 1, each member of the Intelligence Advisory Board will designate a personal representative to remain assigned to his office and detailed as liaison to the Projects Division of the Intelligence Staff of the Office of Reports and Estimates of the Central Intelligence Group.

2. These representatives will, as their chiefs direct, either concur in C.I.G. intelligence estimates or present dissenting opinions.

3. Each intelligence estimate issued by C.I.G. will either have the concurrence of all I.A.B. members or will have any substantial dissent appended as a part of the estimate or follow as provided in 4. below.

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FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE:

[REDACTED]  
Colonel, CGC

Executive for Personnel and Administration

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*File C I G Admin Order* [REDACTED]

16 April 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, R & E

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Subject: Coordination of Central Intelligence Estimates with  
Departmental Intelligence Agencies.

Reference: C.I.G. Administrative Order [REDACTED]

1. Existing procedures with respect to the subject are a hindrance to true coordination through consultation and agreement. Moreover, they impose unacceptable delay in the publication of C.I.G. estimates.

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2. Attached hereto is a draft memorandum for the Director setting forth the defects of the existing procedure, reviewing relevant [REDACTED] American experience, and recommending remedial action.

3. Recommendation: that the draft memorandum for the Director be signed and dispatched.

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[REDACTED]  
Chief, Intelligence Staff, ORE

cc: Chief, Planning Staff  
Chief, Projects Division, I.S. ✓

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**DRAFT**

15 April 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

(Attention: Chief of the I.C.A.F.S.)

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Subject: Coordination of Central Intelligence Estimates with  
Departmental Intelligence Agencies.

Reference: C.I.G. Administrative Order [REDACTED]

1. Existing procedures with respect to the subject are an actual hindrance to true coordination through consultation and agreement. Moreover they impose unacceptable delay in the publication of C.I.G. estimates. Greater collaboration and closer agreement could be attained in less time by a more efficient procedure.

2. The Reference, while mandatory upon O.R.E., is merely permissive with respect to the departmental agencies. The effectiveness of its implementation depends, therefore, upon the extent to which each departmental agency, separately, is willing to enter into effective cooperation with O.R.E. The responsibility for effective coordination, however, rests with C.I.G., which should therefore exercise initiative toward the development of a more efficient procedure, instructing the departmental agencies as to what is required for that purpose.

3. Enclosure "B" contains a review of the experience [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] in this regard, as well as a more detailed description of the experience of the C.I.G. From this body of experience certain conclusions as to a remedy for the existing

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situation are derived.

4. Enclosure "A" contains a draft request upon the members of the I.A.B. for appropriate action in conformity with the conclusions of Enclosure "B".

5. Recommendation: that the memorandum in Enclosure "A" be signed and dispatched.

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ENCLOSURE A

DRAFT

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MEMORANDUM FOR [REDACTED]

GEN. CHAMBERLIN

ADM. INGLIS

GEN. MACDONALD

Subject: Coordination of Central Intelligence Estimates with  
Departmental Intelligence Agencies.

Reference: C.I.G. Administrative Order [REDACTED]

1. Experience during the six months since the issuance of C.I.G. Administrative Order [REDACTED] shows that the procedures in effect for the accomplishment of its purpose are an actual hindrance to true coordination through substantive consultation and agreement and that they impose unacceptable delays in the publication of central intelligence estimates. Greater collaboration and closer agreement could be attained in less time by a more efficient procedure.

2. A review of the experience [REDACTED] of the C.I.G. leads to the conclusion that the essentials of an efficient procedure for the purpose are:

a. That the system be based on direct and informal consultation to the maximum practicable degree, with a minimum of procedural formality and indirection.

b. That coordination with each departmental agency be accomplished through an officer permanently and exclusively charged with that function, directly responsible to the chief

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of that agency, and authorized, on due consultation, to express concurrence or dissent in his name.

c. That each representative, although necessarily a person of broad experience in intelligence appreciation rather than a specialist in any particular subject, be competent and authorized to enter into substantive discussion and to exercise substantive judgment.

d. That each such representative have direct and informal access to the chief of the agency represented by him and to its substantive specialists.

e. That each such representative participate directly in the final formulation of the estimates to be coordinated, so that he may not only represent therein the departmental point of view, but also represent, in departmental consideration of the estimate, the joint (or central) point of view.

3. It is therefore requested that the representatives designated by each permanent member of the I.A.B. in accordance with paragraph 1 of the Reference be detailed full-time to the Projects Division of the Intelligence Staff, O.R.E., and that they be qualified and authorized to function in accordance with the principles indicated in the foregoing paragraph.

4. It is contemplated that these representatives would participate not only in the review and final coordination of C.I.G. estimates, but also in the coordination of the O.R.E. production program with the research and production programs of the departmental agencies, the formulation of the terms of reference of particular C.I.G. estimates, and the formulation of requests upon the departmental

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
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agencies for essential information.

5. It is considered, moreover, that the availability of the representatives of the Service agencies, in a consultative and liaison capacity, would obviate the activation of the projected Military Group of the Functional Branch, O.R.E. with an ultimate saving in manpower.

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4. C.I.G. Administrative Order [REDACTED] Simultaneously with the drafting of N.I.A. Directive No. 1 it was planned to meet the requirement of paragraph 6 therein by providing in the Central Reports Staff an agency for the determination of departmental concurrence or dissent in conformity with the principles indicated above. This plan was formulated in C.I.G. Administrative Order [REDACTED] which follows in abbreviated form:

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3. One Assistant to the Chief, C.R.S., shall be designated by each permanent member of the Intelligence Advisory Board. In distinction from other C.R.S. personnel ... these Assistants shall be assigned to the offices of the permanent members of the I.A.B. and responsible to them, although detailed to serve

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full time with the Chief, C.R.S. They shall:

- a. Represent the interests of their respective members of the (I.A.B.) in the operations of the (C.R.S.).
- b. Represent the (C.R.S.) in its relations with their respective agencies.
- c. Assist the Chief, C.R.S. in: (1) The formulation of directives to the subdivisions of C.R.S. and of requests upon departmental agencies for essential information; (2) The review of summaries, estimates, and studies prepared by the subdivisions of C.R.S....

This concept had been explained to the members of the I.A.B. and the provision of such personnel had been agreed to by them when the draft of N.I.A. Directive No. 2, Appendix "A", was before them for consideration. The plan was never put into effect, however, because the C.R.S. never reached the stage of producing estimates.

5. C.I.G. Administrative Order [REDACTED] The language of C.I.G. Administrative Order [REDACTED] does not preclude the establishment of an effective system of coordination, but neither does it describe such a system and require its implementation.

The actual implementation of this Order to date constitutes the most formal, indirect, cumbersome, and inefficient procedure ever devised for the purpose. This situation is obviously attributable to the fact that, in this context, the interest of the departmental intelligence agencies is essentially negative, to prevent any action possibly prejudicial to them, rather than positive, to contribute toward and expedite the production of acceptable central intelligence estimates.

The actual practice under C.I.G. Administrative Order [REDACTED] stands in contrast to the essentials of an effective procedure indicated in paragraph 3 as follows:

- a. It is extremely indirect and formal. In general, the officers designated by the members of the I.A.B. pursuant to the Order act only to transmit written memoranda without concern to understand and influence the substance and reasoning of either C.I.G. estimates or departmental comment thereon. In consequence they constitute a barrier to the true coordination of intelligence through the constructive reconciliation of divergent (or only apparently divergent) interpretations.
- b. The function of these officers with respect to C.I.G. is incidental to other, departmental duties. None of them feels any responsibility for a constructive contribution to central intelligence.

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c. Whether or not these officers are competent to enter into substantive discussion, they will not do so. They function only as post offices for the transmission of papers between C.I.G. and departmental specialists. In this they constitute a barrier to the direct discussion of points at issue and possible reconciliation of apparently opposing views.

d. In general these officers communicate with the chiefs of the agencies they represent and with its substantive specialists only through written memoranda (at least so far as the subject of this paper is concerned). Being thus uninformed regarding the reasons for a departmental dissent, they obviously cannot discuss the issue or even explain the dissent, but can only transmit it as they have received it.

e. These officers have rarely, if ever, visited ORE, much less participated in the preparation or review of C.I.G. estimates.\* Consequently they are incapable of presenting the C.I.G. point of view or even of interpreting a C.I.G. draft to their principals or to the departmental specialists concerned. For lack of discussion with anyone qualified to inform them on these points, departmental specialists often base their formal comments on misconceptions or address them to issues that could have been resolved in a moment of informal discussion.

The existing procedure is not only an obstacle to the true coordination of intelligence through substantive consultation and agreement, but it also entails unacceptable delay in the publication of completed C.I.G. estimates. For specifications on this latter point see the Appendix. Even with the most thorough prior coordination on the working level two to three weeks are required to obtain final action through the departmental representatives designated under C.I.G. Administrative Order [REDACTED]. The average time required for this purpose is 17 days. Experience has shown that resort to the escape clause in paragraph 4 of the Order produces more difficulties than it avoids.

## 6. Conclusions.

a. That the existing procedure for the final coordination of C.I.G. estimates with the departmental agencies hinders substantive agreement and entails unacceptable delays.

b. That the procedure for that purpose should conform to the specifications in paragraph 3 above.

c. That the members of the I.A.B. should be requested to

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\* Adm. Inglis has designated [REDACTED] a Branch Chief in ORE, as his representative. [REDACTED] however, merely transmits estimates to Capt. Phelan in O.R.I., who functions as do the representatives of the other agencies. This arrangement, consequently, serves only to render communication one degree more indirect.

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detail to the Projects Division of the Intelligence Staff, ORR,  
full-time representatives qualified and authorized to function  
in conformity with paragraph 3 above.

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### APPENDIX

#### TIME REQUIRED FOR FINAL COORDINATION WITH DEPARTMENTAL AGENCIES UNDER EXISTING PROCEDURE

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Ten C.I.G. estimates have been sent to press since the publication of C.I.G. Administrative Order [REDACTED]. The procedure followed in each case and the time required for its completion are indicated below. Even with thorough prior coordination on the working level, two to three weeks are required to obtain final concurrence on the formal level. The average period required for final coordination through the representatives designated under C.I.G. Administrative Order [REDACTED] is 17 days.

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1. O.R.E. 7, Chinese Minorities in Southeast Asia. This estimate had been thoroughly coordinated on the working level prior to its submission to the departmental representatives on 27 November. On 2 December they met with the Intelligence Staff to act on it, concurring without change. Elapsed time in final, formal coordination (without substantive effect): 6 days.

At this meeting the departmental representatives took the position that any substantive coordination must be effected on the working level and that final clearance through them should be accomplished by an exchange of memoranda.

2. O.R.E. 5/1, The Situation in Korea. This estimate had been thoroughly coordinated on the working level.

19 Dec. - Submitted to departmental representatives.  
2 Jan. - Last concurrences received (from State and G-2). Elapsed time: 15 days.

3. O.R.E. 1/1, Revised Soviet Tactics in International Affairs. Shortage of manpower in the EE/USSR Branch prevented specific coordination of this text on the working level prior to its submission.

19 Dec. - Submitted to departmental representatives.  
2 Jan. - Concurred in by all except State.

The State Department representative submitted, as "substantial dissent," a seven-page memorandum of comment to him from DRE. ORE was able to meet most of these comments by slightly re-phrasing its text without substantial change. Others it could

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not accept, and with respect to them it requested that the State representative phrase the Department's dissent for publication, as the memorandum did not do. He was disposed to insist that ORE must change its text with respect to each point of comment, or else phrase the Department's dissent itself, being willing to accept ORE's wording in either case. Ultimately ORE had to insist upon either a concurrence or an explicit dissent by him.

6 Jan. - State representative concurred in text as modified by ORE (without substantial change).

Elapsed time: 19 days.

4. O.R.E. 10, Forthcoming Elections in Bolivia. This estimate was based on written estimates obtained from State and G-2. In view of that fact, and of the fact that the election was only 12 days away, ORE had resort to the escape clause in paragraph 4, C.I.G. Administrative Order [REDACTED]

24 Dec. - Submitted to departmental representatives and simultaneously sent to press.

27 Dec. - Concurred in by all except State.

2 Jan. - "Substantial dissent" by State.

5 Jan. - Election in Bolivia

The State Department dissent was substantial only insofar as it contradicted the advice from that Department on which the C.I.G. estimate had been based. ORE was unwilling to publish it as ORE 10/1 inasmuch as

a. Reproduction could not be completed before the election, after which the entire subject would be without significance.

b. State would thereby be permitted to repudiate its own share of responsibility for the conclusions reached in ORE 10.

c. State's comment was essentially negative rather than constructive. It condemned the C.I.G. estimate without stating any different estimate.

The solution agreed upon was to collaborate on a new estimate of the post-election situation. As yet, however, it has proved impossible to obtain adequate information on which to base such an estimate.

5. O.R.E. 8/1, The Greek Situation. This estimate had been thoroughly coordinated on the working level prior to sub-

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mission.

- 16 Jan. - Submitted to departmental representatives.
- 27 Jan. - Adverse comment by G-2
- 28 Jan. - Concurred in by all except G-2.
- 6 Feb. - Final formulation of G-2 dissent
- Elapsed time: 22 days

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6. O.R.E. 13/1, The Situation in Austria. In view of the experience recited in paragraphs 2 - 5 above, of oral instructions not to call on the Departments for research support, of oral instructions to resort to paragraph 4 of C.I.G. Administrative Order [REDACTED] rather than accept undue delay in the publication of estimate, and of the imminence of the Moscow Conference, this estimate was sent to press without prior coordination.

- 20 Feb. - Submitted to departmental representatives and simultaneously sent to press.
- 28 Feb. - Concurred in by all except State.
- 3 Mar. - "Substantial dissent" by State.

The State Department dissent was, essentially, not a contradiction of the substance of the report, but a complaint that it was not sufficiently broad in scope and consequently misleading. The dissent was intemperate in tone, and negative rather than constructive, in that it condemned the C.I.G. estimate without giving State's opposing estimate of the situation. After direct consultation, in which State's designated representative did not participate, State waived its demand for publication of its dissent and ORE agreed to collaborate in the preparation of a report of the scope desired by State. The joint preparation of such a report is in progress.

7. O.R.E. 14, The Future of Soviet Participation in International Air Transport.

- 25 Feb. - Submitted to departmental representatives
- 5 Mar. - First comment received (from G-2).
- 10 Mar. - Last comment received (from A-2).
- Elapsed time: 14 days.

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8. O.R.E. 15, The Katay Question. This estimate had been thoroughly coordinated on the working level. In view of the emergent situation and of a White House query indicating interest in the subject, report was had to paragraph 4 of C.I.G. Administrative Order [REDACTED]


- 28 Feb. - Submitted to departmental representatives and simultaneously sent to press.
- 7 Mar. - First concurrence (from State).
- 14 Mar. - Last concurrence (from G-2).
- Elapsed time: 15 days.

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10. O.R.E. 16 - Soviet Objectives in Latin America.

- 21 Mar. - Submitted to departmental representatives.
  - 28 Mar. - Concurrence by G-2 and A-2.
  - 28 Mar. - Direct conference with substantive authorities at State regarding prospective dissent.
  - 2 Apr. - Direct conference with substantive authorities from O.N.I. resulting in concurrence.
  - 3 Apr. - Further direct conference at State.
  - 9 Apr. - Further conference with State representatives
  - 10 Apr. - Final formulation of State dissent.
- Elapsed time: 21 days.

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*for signature, Order*  
JUL 25 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASS'T. DIRECTOR FOR REPORTS AND ESTIMATES

Subject: Coordination of Central Intelligence Estimates with the Intelligence Divisions of the State, War and Navy Departments

1. It is the opinion of the Director that no effort should be made at this time to obtain revision of NIA Directive No. 1.
2. Discussion in committees of Congress has indicated concern there lest CIG disseminate intelligence estimates, the content or tenor of which is unknown to the IAB agencies. The Director has assured Congress that this does not happen.
3. It is therefore requested that further consideration be given to improvement in the operation of the present basic policy and that suggestions be submitted for revised procedures if such are considered to be needed.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

DE/mhb  
I-23 July 1947

Registry ✓  
Return to ICAPS  
Chrono

**CAPTAIN, USN**  
**EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR**

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16 July 1947

MEMORANDUM TO : The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Coordination of Central Intelligence Estimates  
with the Intelligence Divisions of the State,  
War and Navy Departments

REFERENCE (A) : Memorandum from Chief, ICAPS, to Acting Assis-  
tant Director, ORE, dated 3 July 1947

REFERENCE (B) : CIG Administrative Order [REDACTED]

REFERENCE (C) : NIA Directive #1

ENCLOSURE (A) : Suggested "Memorandum from the Director of  
Central Intelligence to the Intelligence  
Advisory Board"

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1. Reference (A) requested that the Office of Reports and Estimates submit to the Director an outline of the situation confronting it in the matter of coordinating intelligence estimates with the departmental intelligence divisions prepared in proper form for his possible use at a meeting of the Intelligence Advisory Board.
2. Reference (B) is a CIG Administrative Order touching on this subject.
3. Reference (C) is the basic NIA Directive relating to this subject.
4. Enclosure (A) is a suggested draft of memorandum for circulation to the members of the Intelligence Advisory Board.
5. It is believed that the principal coordinative problem confronting the Office of Reports and Estimates and therefore confronting CIG as a whole relates to the matter of the coordinative procedures required before a Central Intelligence Estimate may be circulated. It

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(ORE #17, 5/31/47- [REDACTED] is  
title on top of folder in [REDACTED] Notes - (62)

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is believed that the present procedures involved in preparing national intelligence requirements are, in general, satisfactory or at least we have not had sufficient experience with these procedures to determine at what points they should be changed. Enclosure (A), therefore, deals exclusively with the problem of correcting the coordinative procedures relating to the production of national intelligence and recommends an appropriate change to NIA Directive #1. If the recommended change to NIA Directive #1 is approved, this will of course entail an appropriate modification of CIG Administrative Order [REDACTED]. Specific recommendation for the change of CIG Administrative Order [REDACTED] is not included in Enclosure (A) because it is considered that the change of a CIG Administrative Order is a matter for determination by the Director of Central Intelligence and not subject to action by members of the Intelligence Advisory Board.

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[REDACTED]  
Assistant Director  
Reports and Estimates

Enclosure - 1

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD:

1. The cumulative experience of the past year with the existing procedure for coordinating Central Intelligence Estimates with the departments represented on the Intelligence Advisory Board has led to an increasing conviction that in the interests of more effective production and presentation of national intelligence, certain of these procedures should be modified. Furthermore, it is believed that these procedures can be so modified as to promote efficiency without in fact militating against thorough coordination of estimates with the intelligence divisions of the departments concerned, which is and must continue to be one of the fundamental considerations entering into the production of a Central Intelligence Estimate.
2. The standard procedure followed by Central Intelligence for inter-agency coordination of its estimates provides for continuous consultation between Central Intelligence and the Intelligence Divisions of the State, War and Navy Departments throughout the preparation of these studies. (Other agencies are consulted as appropriate depending upon the subject matter of the report.) The successive steps of this process are:
  - a. Initially, the Central Intelligence Officers assigned to prepare a report call on the appropriate officers of the Intelligence Divisions of the State, War and Navy Departments. At these meetings, the departmental representatives are informed of the project and are consulted in detail regarding its scope and coverage.
  - b. During the preparation of the report day to day consultation is maintained to the extent necessary to keep informed of departmental views.
  - c. Upon completion of a preliminary draft of the report, it is referred to the appropriate officers of the Intelligence Divisions of the State, War and Navy Departments for comment, criticism, suggestion and possible amendment. The views of these experts are thoroughly considered and, at a series of conferences,

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revisions are worked out and usually agreement is reached on a revised draft acceptable to all concerned.

g. The draft report incorporating any revisions arrived at as a result of the procedures outlined in g above is then referred through official channels to the Intelligence Divisions of the State, War and Navy Departments for formal concurrence through representatives of those departments specifically designated for this purpose by each of the members of the Intelligence Advisory Board (see CIG Administrative Order [REDACTED] implementing NIA Directive #1, paragraph 6).

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2. Formal comments on this revised draft report are received from the departmental intelligence divisions and are made the basis for further revising the revised report to produce a final draft of the report. Whenever there is a dissent or a divergence of point of view on the part of any one of the departmental intelligence divisions, the matter is discussed in detail between representatives of Central Intelligence and the dissenting departmental intelligence division. If these representatives are unable to resolve their differences, the statement of the dissenting departmental intelligence division, setting forth its views, is published as a part of the finished report.

3. Consideration of the coordinating procedure outlined in paragraph 2 above and actual operation of the procedure for almost a year bring out the following points:

a. From its inception to the completion of a revised draft (step g of paragraph 2), each Central Intelligence Estimate represents the cooperative effort of the appropriate expert officers of Central Intelligence and of the Intelligence Divisions of the State, War and Navy Departments.

b. In every case, at the conclusion of step g, agreement has been attained or it is apparent that there will be a dissenting opinion by some one of the departmental intelligence divisions. Furthermore, the general tenor of any dissenting opinion is known.

g. Actual experience has shown that despite the best efforts of the departmental intelligence divisions, the time required to

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complete steps d and e entail a minimum delay in publication of two weeks, and in those rare instances where a dissenting opinion is involved, the delay is much longer, in some instances as much as two months.

d. Experience has also shown that additional comments received as a result of accomplishing steps d and e have, in general, made no material contribution to the estimate. This result is, of course a natural consequence of the thorough consultation and exchange of views of the appropriate expert officers of Central Intelligence and the departmental intelligence divisions, which is an accomplished fact at the conclusion of step e.

4. One of the functions of Central Intelligence, if not the most important function, is that of coordinating the intelligence efforts of governmental intelligence agencies. In this instance, it is a matter of thoroughly coordinating the production of particular types of intelligence reports between the Intelligence Divisions of the State, War and Navy Departments and Central Intelligence. The rigid and cumbersome techniques established to effect this coordination in fact place in the hands of any one of the intelligence divisions of the participating departments the power of determining when and to what extent coordination has been accomplished. Under the system this power is absolute and can be exercised at the sole and absolute discretion of any one agency irrespective of the desires or views of all of the others. Manifestly the situation is an absurdity in that the coordinator (Central Intelligence) cannot discharge its responsibilities except on the sufferance of each one of the very agencies it is required to coordinate. It is believed that this situation is fundamentally wrong, is pregnant with possibilities of friction and is capable of gravely impairing the production and presentation of national intelligence. In view of the fact that Central Intelligence is required to coordinate the production of national intelligence, it is believed that concomittant responsibility for this coordination must be vested in Central Intelligence. In this instance this involves:

a. Determination by Central Intelligence of when coordination has been sufficiently accomplished.

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**b. Determination of coordination procedures by Central Intelligence.**

In this connection it may be remarked that Central Intelligence is responsible to the National Intelligence Authority for the performance of its duties and not to the Intelligence Divisions of the State, War and Navy Departments. In their discretion, of course, these intelligence divisions enjoy the privilege of bringing to the attention of the National Intelligence Authority any matters touching on the duty performance of Central Intelligence.

**5. It is therefore recommended that the principle be accepted that:**

**a. Central Intelligence determine when and to what degree coordination is necessary in the production of national intelligence.**

**b. Coordination procedures be determined by Central Intelligence.**

**6. In order to place the foregoing principle into effect, it is recommended that:**

**a. NIA Directive #1, dated 8 February 1946, "Policies and Procedures Governing the Central Intelligence Group", be revised at paragraph 6 as follows:**

**"6. The Central Intelligence Group will utilize all available intelligence in producing strategic and national policy intelligence. All intelligence reports prepared by the Central Intelligence Group will note any substantial dissent by a participating intelligence agency. Participating intelligence agencies may dissent from any intelligence report prepared by the Central Intelligence Group, and dissenting opinions so prepared will be made available to all holders of reports dissented from."**

(NOTE: The change to NIA Directive #1, as outlined above, will of course entail a suitable modification of CIG Administrative Order [REDACTED])

**7. As a matter for Central Intelligence determination, it is considered that the procedure for coordinating the production of national**

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intelligence will include steps a to g, inclusive, of paragraph 2. In the case of dissenting opinions on the part of any of the departmental intelligence divisions, these dissents, if obtained in time, will be published with the Central Intelligence Estimate; or if received too late for such publication, will be published as soon as received and circulated to all the recipients of the estimates. Each Central Intelligence Estimate will contain an affirmative statement of agreement or disagreement on the part of each departmental intelligence division.

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